Website fingerprinting is a privacy attack in which an adversary applies machine learning to predict the website a user visits through Tor. Recent work proposes evaluating WF attacks using the "genuine" patterns or traces of Tor users’ natural interactions that can be measured by Tor exit relays, but these traces do not accurately reflect the patterns that an entry-side WF attacker would observe. In this paper, we present new methods for transducing exit traces into entry traces that we can use to more accurately estimate the risk WF poses to real Tor users. Our methods leverage trace timestamps and metadata to extract multiple round-trip time estimates and use them to "shift" traces to the perspective of a target vantage point. We show through extensive evaluation that our methods outperform the state of the art across multiple synthetic and genuine datasets and are considerably more efficient; they enable researchers to more accurately represent the real-world challenge facing an entry-side WF adversary, and produce augmented datasets that allow an adversary to boost the performance of existing WF attacks.
@inproceedings{cellshift-ndss2026,
title = {CellShift: RTT-Aware Trace Transduction for Real-World Website Fingerprinting},
author = {Jansen, Rob},
booktitle = {Network and Distributed System Security Symposium},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.14722/ndss.2026.231004},
}